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Abstract
This paper tests for the existence of contagion during the 1997/98 Asian
crisis. We interpret contagion as a signiﬁcant change in the way that country-
speciﬁc shocks are transmitted across international stock markets. Using the
full-information framework of Favero and Giavazzi (2002) we ﬁnd that the null
hypothesis of no contagion is widely rejected. We also uncover evidence of
an asymmetric transmission of shocks. Since our results contrast with those
obtained by Rigobon (2001, 2002) using a limited-information methodology we
present Monte Carlo simulations which show that certain necessary conditions
must be satisﬁed for this method to have power. For parameter values in line
with our econometric estimations we conclude that the power of the limited-
information approach remains relatively low.
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1Executive summary
During the last decade international ﬁnancial markets have been aﬀected by sev-
eral major currency and ﬁnancial crises. Although such episodes of turbulence are
not a new phenomenon, the apparent high degree of international transmission of
these crises has triggered a large research eﬀort both at the theoretical and empirical
levels. The keyword is contagion.
The existing empirical literature focuses on two related sets of issues. On the one
hand, a large number of studies aims to distinguish through which channels country-
speciﬁc shocks such as sharp devaluations or banking crises are propagated across
nations. The goal is to discriminate between diﬀerent explanations for this prop-
agation: trade linkages, ﬁnancial integration, macroeconomic similarities, common
lender eﬀects, common external disturbances, etc. On the other hand, the second set
of issues deals with the existence of contagion deﬁned in a particular way. In this
branch of the literature, contagion is deﬁned as a signiﬁcant change in the way that
country-speciﬁc shocks are transmitted internationally. In other words, we can specify
a null hypothesis that the underlying transmission mechanism is stable across tranquil
periods and episodes of high ﬁnancial turbulence. While the ﬁrst set of issues deals
with the nature of interdependence, the second set focuses on how interdependence
is aﬀected by abnormal high-volatility events in ﬁnancial markets.
In fact, simply testing whether shocks are transmitted across borders does not
make much sense. The process of globalization has reinforced the various linkages
between open economies, thereby making these more interdependent. To this extent,
observing transmission of economic disturbances should come as no surprise. A more
interesting question is whether the strength of the transmission mechanism remains
stable over time. This is the central question of the contagion literature and it is this
question that lies at the core of this paper.
The traditional empirical approach makes use of correlation analysis. The cen-
tral idea is to assess whether the correlation coeﬃcient between two stock markets
changes across periods of low and high volatility. However, numerous studies have rec-
ognized that focusing on correlations can be misleading. Moreover, such an approach
does not properly model the interdependence across international ﬁnancial markets.
Therefore, recent research builds upon structural models of simultaneous equations
which aim is to properly account for interdependencies. Rigobon (2001, 2002) pro-
poses a limited-information procedure which uses the heteroscedastic feature of high-
frequency ﬁnancial data to build an instrumental variable. In this context, a test for
contagion amounts to testing for the validity of the constructed instrument. When
this methodology is applied to emerging markets it is found that the transmission
mechanism remains stable over time. In other words, contagion does not exist.
Our paper pursues two objectives. Firstly, we use an alternative empirical ap-
proach pioneered by Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and test for the existence of conta-
gion during the 1997/98 south-east Asian crisis. We focus on ﬁve countries, namely
the Philippines, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. In contrast with Rigobon
2(2002) we uncover strong evidence against the null hypothesis of a stable transmis-
sion mechanism. In other words, contagion exists and country-speciﬁc shocks are
propagated internationally in a nonlinear way. Interestingly, positive shocks can have
either a positive or a negative impact on other stock markets, whereas negative shocks
have a more systematic negative eﬀect on other markets. We interpret this result as
prima facie evidence that investors discriminate among stock markets in good times,
but tend to exit all markets in bad times.
Secondly, to the extent that the empirical results on the existence of contagion
depend upon the chosen methodology, we study possible methodological explana-
tions for this divergence using Monte Carlo simulations. We study the power of the
approach proposed by Rigobon (2000) and ﬁnd that it has power only when cer-
tain conditions are satisﬁed. In particular, the power of the test depends on the
relative sizes of the sub-samples of low and high volatility, the relative degree of het-
eroscedasticity across these sub-samples, as well as the total number of observations.
Interestingly, selecting parameters on the basis of our empirical estimations leads the
limited-information methodology to reject the stability of the transmission mecha-
nism with a probability of half when it should in fact be rejected with a probability
of 0.95. This result can be a ﬁrst step in explaining the divergence of our results with
those obtained by Rigobon (2001, 2002).
The existence of nonlinearities in the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks has im-
portant implications for portfolio management and the measurement of the potential
beneﬁts from international portfolio diversiﬁcation. Firstly, changes in the trans-
mission mechanism make it more diﬃcult for portfolio managers to rebalance their
portfolios optimally. Secondly, a usual approach to discuss the beneﬁts of diversiﬁ-
cation relies on a consideration of cross-market correlations. It has been argued that
since correlations increase during periods of crises, these beneﬁts become reduced just
when they are most needed. Our results show that such statements are incomplete
since changes in market comovements in times of high turbulence are not unidirec-
tional. Further research should assess the implications of our results for the empirical
measurement of the beneﬁts of international portfolio diversiﬁcation.
31 Introduction and motivation
During the last decade international ﬁnancial markets have been aﬀected by several
major currency and ﬁnancial crises. Indeed, we have recently celebrated the tenth
anniversary of the speculative attacks on the parities of the Exchange Rate Mech-
anism in Europe in September 1992. Other famous examples include the 1994/95
Mexican ”Tequila” crisis, the 1997/98 Asian ﬂu, the 1998 Russian virus followed by
the Brazilian crisis in early 1999. Lately, the collapse of the Turkish stabilization
strategy and the eventual abandonment of the Argentinean currency board ended a
ten-year series of severe crises in foreign exchange and ﬁnancial markets.
Currency and ﬁnancial crises are certainly not a new phenomenon. However,
the apparent high degree of international transmission of these crises has triggered
a large research eﬀort both at the theoretical and empirical levels. The keyword is
contagion. The empirical literature focuses on two related sets of issues. The ﬁrst
set of issues deals with the channels through which country-speciﬁc shocks such as
sharp devaluations are propagated across borders. The goal is mainly to discriminate
between diﬀerent explanations for contagion: trade and ﬁnancial linkages, macroeco-
nomic similarities, common lender eﬀects, common external shocks, etc. The second
set of issues deals with the existence of contagion per se. In this context, contagion
is deﬁned as a signiﬁcant change in the way that country-speciﬁc shocks are transmit-
ted internationally1. Alternatively, we can interpret contagion as a rejection of the
null hypothesis that the transmission mechanism is stable across tranquil periods and
episodes of high ﬁnancial turbulence.
It makes a lot of sense to adopt this deﬁnition of contagion. The process of
globalization has reinforced the various linkages between open economies, making
these more interdependent. Therefore, testing whether shocks are transmitted across
borders or not does not make much sense. Any international macroeconomic model
would allow for an analysis of the impact of external shocks on the domestic economy.
A more interesting question is whether the strength of the transmission mechanism
through which large country-speciﬁc shocks are transmitted remains stable over time.
This is the central question of the contagion literature. It is this question that lies at
the core of this paper.
There are at least two important reasons which motivate the empirical assessment
of the stability of the propagation mechanism. Firstly, ﬁnancial market participants
beneﬁt from international portfolio diversiﬁcation. The process of globalization oﬀers
new investment opportunities. To the extent that economic and political shocks are
mostly seen as idiosyncratic, investing in a higher number of countries allows for a
reduction in risk exposure. In this context, the key variable is the correlation across
1Contagion carries the implicit meaning that cross-market linkages should be stronger in periods
of high turbulence. This view is limiting in the sense that country-speciﬁc shocks could also weaken
these linkages. Allowing for a change and not speciﬁcally an increase will be important in empirical
work, as we shall see.
4ﬁnancial markets. Therefore, if the strength of the transmission mechanism of id-
iosyncratic shocks changes when such large shocks occur in one country, the beneﬁts
of international diversiﬁcation will be modiﬁed. It must be noted that correlations
may not necessarily increase but they could also decrease. If we consider a geographi-
cal region consisting of strong and weak countries, as deﬁned by their macroeconomic
fundamentals, it could be the case that investors pull their funds out of weak countries
into strong countries. As a consequence, the degree of covariation among ﬁnancial
markets would become lower. In any case, portfolio management requires knowledge
of the degree of comovements among ﬁnancial markets, and changes in the strength
of these comovements will have important eﬀects.
Secondly, and more controversially, testing for the stability of the propagation
mechanism is also important as far as interventions by multilateral institutions are
concerned. Some scholars have argued that if country-speciﬁc shocks are transmitted
along the usual channels of interdependence across countries, without any sort of
nonlinearity, then the spread of a crisis is only the result of globalization and thus,
there is no motivation for public intervention, either by the International Monetary
Fund or industrialised countries.
Early analyses of the existence of contagious eﬀects focus on changes in correla-
tion coeﬃcients. This measure, however, suﬀers from numerous adjustment problems.
Moreover, it does not properly model the interdependence across international ﬁnan-
cial markets. Consequently, recent research builds upon ad-hoc structural models of
simultaneous equations which aim is to properly account for interdependencies be-
tween ﬁnancial markets, so as to avoid a spurious detection of contagion. The estima-
tion of such models is not without problems, most notably because of identiﬁcation
problems. However, Rigobon (2000) proposes an innovative procedure which does
not require any arbitrary restrictions on the econometric speciﬁcation but uses the
heteroscedastic feature of the ﬁnancial time series. The central idea is to use the het-
eroscedasticity to identify diﬀerent volatility regimes and to classify the observations
accordingly so as to build an instrumental variable. A test for the existence of con-
tagion is then simply a test for the validity of the constructed instrument. Rigobon
(2001, 2002) applies this approach to emerging market countries and concludes in
favour of the stability of the transmission mechanism.
An alternative approach, pioneered by Favero and Giavazzi (2002), also makes
use of a structural model of interdependence. However, rather than relying on an
instrumental-variable estimation procedure, it starts by estimating the reduced-form
model, which turns out to be a vector-autoregression speciﬁcation, to identify country-
speciﬁc shocks. These are then included into the structural model which is estimated
using a full-information procedure, making arbitrary restrictions on the lag structure
to obtain identiﬁcation. A test for contagion is simply a test of whether shocks in
one country have a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the equations for other countries, having
controlled for interdependence. Favero and Giavazzi (2002) apply this approach in
the context of the parities of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in the early nineties and
5ﬁnd widespread evidence of rejection of the stability of the propagation mechanism.
This paper pursues two objectives. Firstly, we apply the full-information method-
ology to a sample of emerging market countries. More precisely, we test for the
existence of contagion during the Asian crisis for a sample of ﬁve south-east Asian
stock markets. In contrast with Rigobon (2002), we uncover strong evidence against
the stability of the transmission mechanism. Country-speciﬁc shocks are propagated
across countries in a nonlinear way. Positive shocks can have either a positive or a
negative impact on other stock markets, whereas negative shocks have a more sys-
tematic negative eﬀect on other stock markets. This points towards the existence of
an asymmetric international transmission of country-speciﬁc extreme events.
Secondly, since the empirical results about the existence of contagion depend upon
the chosen methodology, we follow Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and integrate the two
approaches within a common framework of analysis. Then, we make use of Monte
Carlo simulations to determine the source of these diverging results. We ﬁnd that the
limited-information approach is appropriate only when certain conditions are satis-
ﬁed. In particular, the power of the test proposed by Rigobon (2000) depends on the
relative sizes of the sub-samples conditional on volatility, the relative degree of het-
eroscedasticity across these sub-samples, as well as the total number of observations.
Since this methodology features applications in various ﬁelds of economics, it remains
very important to assess its limitations, especially with respect to data availability.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an non-exhaustive survey
of the literature on contagion. Section 3 describes the full-information framework of
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and discusses some implications of the speciﬁcation of
the null hypothesis. Section 4 deals with the choice of the data and sample period.
Section 5 presents the empirical results about the existence of contagion. Section 6
presents our Monte Carlo simulations while section 7 concludes.
2 Survey of the literature
This section provides a non-exhaustive survey of the literature on contagion. We
develop a chronological view of the evolution of the literature and present the central
references for each state of improvement of the methodologies that have been used2.
2.1 The early literature: a signal extraction approach
The early studies on the existence of contagion appear after the 1987 stock mar-
ket crash in the United States and the simultaneous collapse of several other stock
markets, despite signiﬁcantly diﬀerent economic conditions. The seminal reference is
2Claessens, Dornbusch and Park (2000) provide a broad overview of the contagion literature.
For an enlightening organising framework of the channels of ﬁnancial contagion, see Pritsker (2001).
Rigobon (2001) discusses the various methodologies that have been adopted to test for the existence
of contagion.
6King and Wadhwani (1990). They construct a signal extraction model where ratio-
nal agents face imperfect information. Investors have access to diﬀerent information
sets and therefore, they are able to infer valuable information from price changes in
other markets. Suppose two countries, 1 and 2. The change in the (log of the) stock
market index, written as s, is related to systematic information, u, and idiosyncratic
information, v. Whereas the former type of information aﬀects both countries, the
latter is by deﬁnition relevant only to one country. Under imperfect information, the
generating process for changes in stock prices is given by
s1,t = u1,t + α12E1(u2,t) + v1,t (1)
s2,t = α21E2(u1,t) + u2,t + v2,t (2)
where E1(.) and E2(.) stand for the expectations operator conditional upon infor-
mation observed in markets 1 and 2, respectively. It is thus assumed that the only
information available to market i about the value of uj is sj. Investors in market 1
cannot determine whether some realization of s2 occurs because of an idiosyncratic
news, through v2,t, or because of a systematic eﬀect, through u2,t.
Solving this signal extraction problem and computing the variances of s1,t and
s2,t, we obtain that the variances are larger in the case of perfect information than
in that of imperfect information. Therefore, the correlation coeﬃcient will be larger
in the latter case. Consider the impact of an idiosyncratic shock in one market on
the price in the other market. In the case of perfect information, this shock has no
impact on the other market since agents know that it is relevant only to one market.
However, in the case of imperfect information, because investors cannot distinguish
whether the change in the price stems from systematic or idiosyncratic information,
this shock has an impact, so that the two markets move together.
This theoretical model shows why markets should move together for reasons un-
related to country-speciﬁc economic fundamentals. King and Wadhwani (1990) hy-
pothesize that in times of increased volatility, investors will place a greater weight
on price changes in other stock markets. Therefore, the empirical prediction is that
the correlation coeﬃcient between two markets should increase following the occur-
rence of a large idiosyncratic shock. King and Wadhwani (1990) use hourly data for
stock price changes in the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom for the
period from September 1987 to November 1987. They ﬁnd evidence of contagion,
deﬁned as a signiﬁcant increase in correlation coeﬃcients, after the collapse of the
Dow Jones. Bertero and Mayer (1990) extend the analysis to a sample of 23 indus-
trialised countries and emerging market countries, using daily data. They also ﬁnd
that correlation coeﬃcients increase appreciably following the stock market crash in
the United States.
The ﬁrst applications of correlation analysis to emerging market economies focus
on the 1994/95 Mexican crisis and the 1997/98 Asian ﬂu. Calvo and Reinhart (1996)
look at cross-country correlations between weekly stock market returns. The sample
7includes seven Latin American countries and six south-east Asian countries. They
ﬁnd that correlations among returns increase during the period following the deval-
uation of the Mexican peso. They also examine cross-country correlations between
total returns on Brady bonds and conclude again that these increase markedly after
the Mexican currency crisis. Baig and Goldfajn (1999) examine cross-country corre-
lations among currencies, stock markets, interest rates and sovereign spreads of ﬁve
south-east Asian economies, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, the Philippines and
Indonesia. They ﬁnd strong evidence of contagion in foreign exchange markets and
among sovereign spreads, while the evidence in stock markets and among interest
rates remains rather mixed.
2.2 Pitfalls: the bias and the need for correcting
In a series of innovating papers, Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 2002) show that looking
at unadjusted correlation coeﬃcients is not appropriate. The calculated correlation
coeﬃcient is an increasing function of the variance of the underlying asset return, so
that when coeﬃcients between a tranquil period and a crisis period are compared,
the coeﬃcient in the crisis period is biased upwards as volatility rises widely3.
We follow Baumann (2000) to illustrate the dependence of the correlation coeﬃ-
cient on volatility. The stock market returns of two countries 1 and 2 are related in
the following way, assuming no problem of endogeneity or omitted variable:
s2,t = α + βs1,t + εt (3)
where the error term has a zero mean and constant variance, and E(s1,tεt) = 0.

























For absolute values of the correlation coeﬃcient this derivative is unambiguously
positive and hence, the correlation coeﬃcient is biased upwards and requires an ad-
justment. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) revisit the early literature and test for the
existence of contagion during the 1997/98 Asian crisis, the 1994/95 Mexican crisis
and the 1987 stock market crash in the United States. When unadjusted correlation
coeﬃcients are computed, there is ample evidence of rejection of the null hypothesis
of equality of these coeﬃcients across tranquil and crisis periods. However, adjusted
3See also Boyer, Gibson and Loretan (1999) and Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001).
8correlation coeﬃcients yield the famous result ”no contagion, only interdependence”.
In other words, contagion does not exist.
Loretan and English (2000) explore the relationship between correlations and in-
creases in volatility in crises periods. They assess to what extent the increase in
correlation coeﬃcients at times of market turbulence can be explained by the inher-
ent increase in volatility. The results point to the fact that increases in correlation
coeﬃcients stem from the higher volatility of asset returns in crises periods, thereby
corroborating the results obtained by Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
The adjustment procedure has in turn been questioned and at least two papers
cast some light on its inadequacy. Baumann (2000) recalls that the procedure is based
on a model of asset returns which explicitly disregards the issue of endogeneity. In
eﬀect, a simple model of asset return determination would augment equation (3) with
a corresponding equation for s1. Baumann (2000) computes the correlation coeﬃcient
in the case of simultaneous equations. There is still a bias but its direction can be
positive or negative depending on the parameters of the structural model. Therefore,
the adjustment proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) should be taken with extreme
caution since it relies upon an assumption of exogeneity which is clearly doubtful.
Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2002) build a factor model of asset returns and
show that the correction procedure of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) relies on arbitrary
assumptions about the variance of the country-speciﬁc shocks where the crisis origi-
nates. The factor model is written as
s1 = α1 + γ1f + ε1 (6)
s2 = α2 + γ2f + ε2 (7)
where f is a common factor aﬀecting both returns and ε1 and ε2 are country-
speciﬁc shocks. We will assume that the crisis C originates in country 2, so that
V ar(s2|C) = (1 + δ)V ar(s2), δ > 0 (8)
V ar(ε1|C) = V ar(ε1) (9)
Solving equations (6) and (7) for the common factor, equating the obtained results


















s1 = α + βs2 + ε (11)
which is equivalent to the basic speciﬁcation (3) of Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
The assumptions underlying equation (11) are, as before, that
9Cov(s2,ε | C) = Cov(s2,ε) = 0 (12)
V ar(ε | C) = V ar(ε) (13)
Firstly, if s2 reﬂects idiosyncratic noise, so that V ar(ε2) > 0, then Cov(s2,ε) is
not equal to zero, thereby violating (12). Secondly, if V ar(ε2) increases during the
crisis period, then the other assumption (13) is also violated. Therefore, the analysis
provided by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) is only valid under the unrealistic assump-
tion that V ar(ε2) is equal to zero. Consequently, the ratio between this variance of
the idiosyncratic shock in country 2 and the variance of the common factor will be
equal to zero. Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2002) build a ”theoretical” correlation
coeﬃcient under the null hypothesis of no contagion, which is to be compared with
the correlation coeﬃcient in the crisis period. The former coeﬃcient depends on the
ratio between the variance of the idiosyncratic shock and that of the common factor.
Since this ratio is assumed to be zero, as explained above, the test of Forbes and
Rigobon (2002) will be biased towards not rejecting the null hypothesis. Hence, it is
not surprising that studies making use of adjusted correlation coeﬃcients ﬁnd almost
no evidence of contagion4.
2.3 The recent contributions
Apart from the numerous adjustment problems associated with the analysis of corre-
lation coeﬃcients, the methodologies presented so far abstract from the problem of
endogeneity between asset returns. This modelling strategy is not satisfactory. Any
analysis of the propagation of shocks between Thailand and Malaysia should allow
for two-way interdependencies. Restrictions on the contemporaneous relationships
across international stock markets are not appropriate and should not be used5.
Therefore, the recent contributions make use of ad-hoc structural systems of si-
multaneous equations. A simple model of asset returns would be speciﬁed as, in
deviations form
s1,t = βs2,t + εt (14)
s2,t = αs1,t + ηt (15)
4Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2002) provide some estimates of the variance ratios. These are
typically contained in an interval between 2 and 4, thereby being signiﬁcantly higher than the
implicitly assumed value of zero in Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
5As an exception, we note that stock markets around the world are not open at the same time. In
other words, trading time asymmetries imply, for example, that Brazil’s stock return depends on to-
day’s Russian return, whereas Russia’s return depends on yesterday’s Brazilian return. This feature
would allow for a recursive system of simultaneous equations. In this case, setting a zero restriction
on the contemporaneous eﬀect of the Brazilian market on the Russian market is appropriate and
ordinary least squares yield consistent parameter estimates.
10where neither β or α are restricted to be zero, and εt and ηt are country-speciﬁc
shocks. In this case, this system is unidentiﬁed and as such, it is impossible to obtain
parameter estimates for β and α. Two recent contributions propose solutions to this
problem of identiﬁcation. The rest of this section describes brieﬂy the innovative
approach proposed by Rigobon (2000). The next section discusses in more details
the methodology introduced by Favero and Giavazzi (2002) which is used to test for
the existence of contagion in the context of the 1997/98 Asian crisis.
Rigobon (2000) provides an instrumental-variable methodology to test for conta-
gion. The basic speciﬁcation can be written in the bivariate case as (14) and (15),
which already assumes normalization of the matrix of coeﬃcients on the contempo-
raneous variables, and orthogonalization of the country-speciﬁc shocks. Importantly,
it is also assumed that the country where the crisis originates is known. Since the
system of equations is not identiﬁed, we cannot obtain parameter estimates for the
coeﬃcients and we cannot assess whether they are stable over time.
However, suppose that the data are characterized by two regimes of volatility, low
and high, and that the increase in volatility across regimes is entirely the consequence
of an increase in the variance of one of the two country-speciﬁc shocks. In this case, we
can split the whole sample into two sub-samples according to the volatility regime.














The corresponding instrumental-variable estimator is simply given by




and this estimator satisﬁes the necessary conditions under the null hypothesis of
no contagion7. Therefore, a test for the existence of contagion is simply implemented
as a Hausman-type test for the validity of the instrument wt.
Rigobon (2001) uses this methodology to test for the stability of the propagation
mechanism of shocks across stock and bond markets, for a sample of fourteen Latin
American and south-east Asian countries. The central ﬁnding is that the transmission
channel is remarkably stable for stock markets, whereas there is some limited evidence
of instability of parameters in bond markets. Rigobon (2002) focuses on a wider
sample of thirty-six industrialised and emerging market economies and concludes
that ”the high comovement across international stock markets is not the result of
changes in the propagation mechanism, but the outcome of strong interdependence
6The construction of an instrument for s1 is completely symmetric and thus, it is omitted here.
7The two usual conditions for the validity of an instrument are that this instrument should be
correlated with the original variable that it replaces, but uncorrelated with the error term.
11among these markets that is present at all times”8.
In the next section we discuss another approach to testing for the existence of
contagion that also relies upon a structural model of interdependence. Then, we
apply this alternative methodology to the 1997/98 Asian crisis in order to assess the
stability of the transmission mechanism.
3 Econometric speciﬁcation
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) propose a three-step procedure to testing for nonlinear-
ities in the propagation mechanism of country-speciﬁc shocks9. The ﬁrst step is to
estimate a reduced-form vector-autoregression model and to identify with dummy
variables large residuals as country-speciﬁc shocks. The second step is to estimate
the structural model of interdependence, including the dummy variables, and making
some arbitrary assumptions on the lag structure to obtain identiﬁcation. Finally, we
can test for the existence of contagion.
We start with the following dynamic structural model of interdependence:
BS = Γ(L)S + E (18)
where S is a vector of stock market returns and B is a non-diagonal matrix of
coeﬃcients on the contemporaneous eﬀects. It is well known that the reduced form
of a general dynamic structural model can be expressed as a vector-autoregressive






















where the residuals in (20) are heteroscedastic and non-normal. Therefore, the
sample may include episodes of high market turbulence. These are captured by
dummy variables, thereby eliminating heteroscedasticity and non-normality. Focusing
on the bivariate case for clarity of exposition and assuming an optimal lag length of
one, we can rewrite the VAR speciﬁcation as
8Rigobon (2002), p. 2
9Favero and Giavazzi (2002) use the term ”nonlinearities” to refer to the phenomenon of con-
tagion. The reason is to avoid the implicit meaning of contagion as a signiﬁcant reinforcement in
cross-market relationships during episodes of high market turbulence. In fact, signiﬁcant reductions
in these relationships should also be interpreted as contagion.






















































The partitioning of the matrix containing the dummy variables is conditional on
the country in which the shock originates. Moreover, l
1,t and l
2,t are the structural
shocks in periods of low volatility. The oﬀ-diagonal blocks of the matrix A allow for
nonlinearities in the propagation of shocks between countries. Therefore, a simple
test for the absence of nonlinearities speciﬁes the following null hypothesis:
H0 : aij = 0, ∀ i 6= j (25)
The estimation of the reduced-form model (20) is the ﬁrst step of the methodology.
Then, large residuals are deﬁned as events and represented by dummy variables.
Again, this allows to ﬁlter out heteroscedasticity and non-normality. The second
step is to estimate the structural model of interdependence. Unfortunately, this
system of simultaneous equations is not identiﬁed. To remedy this problem, some
restrictions are imposed. Because the general-to-speciﬁc approach is followed, it is
more appropriate to restrict the coeﬃcients on the lagged endogenous variables than
on the contemporaneous feedbacks. Therefore, the own lagged dependent variable is
assumed to be suﬃcient to capture the structural dynamics11, i.e. γij = 0, ∀ i 6= j. In
this way, the system of equations is exactly identiﬁed as each equation in the system
is itself identiﬁed.
One remark is worth mentioning. The speciﬁcation of the null hypothesis in
this framework is more general than in earlier analyses of correlation coeﬃcients.
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) adopt the following hypothesis to test for the existence
of contagion:
H0 : a12 = a21 = 0 (26)
In contrast, the core idea of the former correlation approach is a comparison of
the correlation (or covariance) between two asset returns during a relatively stable
period to that during a period of turbulence. In that context, contagion is deﬁned as
a signiﬁcant increase in the cross-market correlation during the period of turmoil. In
terms of the full-information approach, the alternative hypothesis would be that a12
11This assumption is not uncontroversial. Rigobon (2001) argues that the theoretical foundations
are extremely weak. Consider two countries, home and foreign. If it is true that the home returns
are explained by current foreign as well as past home returns, it seems reasonable that past foreign
returns should also have some explanatory power for current home returns.
13or a21 or both are strictly greater than zero. However, when testing for nonlinearities,
we allow for a more general alternative hypothesis which is that either a12 or a21 or
both are diﬀerent from zero. In particular, these could be signiﬁcantly negative, as
we shall see.
Finally, there is accumulating evidence that the economic policies followed by ma-
jor industrialised countries have a large impact on the economies of emerging market
countries. In a seminal paper on the determinants of capital ﬂows to Latin America
between the end of the ”lost decade” and the early nineties, Calvo, Leiderman and
Reinhart (1993) ﬁnd that the large increase in capital inﬂows is partly due to exter-
nal factors, such as lower international interest rates and the recession in the United
States. Indeed, they argue that ”some of the renewal of capital ﬂows to Latin Amer-
ica results from external factors and can be considered an external shock common to
the region”12. In a premonitory discussion on the policy implications of these results,
they conclude that ”the importance of external factors suggests that a reversal of
those conditions [outside the region] may lead to a future capital outﬂow, increasing
the macroeconomic vulnerability of Latin American economies”13.
Recent studies conﬁrm that international factors are important determinants of
the economic situation of emerging market countries. Frankel, Schmukler and Serven
(2002) ﬁnd that these economies exhibit high sensitivity to international interest
rates, especially under ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. Reinhart and Reinhart (2001)
present stylized facts on the impact of economic conditions in the United States on
emerging markets. They conclude that economic downturns in the United States have
adverse consequences on emerging markets, in particular for those whose export share
to the United States is large. Moreover, capital ﬂows to emerging markets increase
markedly in years when U.S. monetary policy is easing, thereby corroborating the
results obtained by Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993)14.
The signiﬁcant impact of common externals shocks has an empirical implication.
If these are not taken into account, one may conclude wrongly that a crisis in one
country is transmitted to other countries, while the shock is actually external and
common to all the countries. We model common shocks explicitly by introducing a
matrix C of so-called monsoonal variables into the model of interdependence, so that
the structural model is now given by
BS = Γ(L)S + ΨC + E (27)
and the reduced-form model is obtained as
12Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993), p. 109
13Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993), p. 108
14Frankel and Roubini (2001) discuss the various ways in which macroeconomic policies followed
by industrial countries can impact on emerging markets. Evidence on the eﬀect of common external
shocks on the incidence of currency crises can be found in Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferretti






S = Π(L)S + ΘC + B
−1E (29)
This extended speciﬁcation allows to capture common external shocks separately.
Therefore, when constructing the dummy variables which capture events, we retain
only purely country-speciﬁc events.
4 Data
We test for the existence of contagious eﬀects in the context of the 1997/98 Asian
crisis. The sample contains ﬁve south-east Asian countries, namely the Philippines,
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia and it extends from 1st January 1996 to
31st July 1998. The choice for this period is motivated by the fact that there were
no other large-scale currency or ﬁnancial crisis in emerging market economies. If
our sample would overlap with some other crisis episode, it would imply a need for
modelling the impact of this other crisis on the south-east Asian region.
We make use of data at the daily frequency. All the data are retrieved from
Datastream. Stock market indices are expressed in local currency and as calculated by
the International Finance Corporation (IFC). These indices are intended to represent
the performance of the most active stocks in their respective stock markets and to be
the broadest possible indicator of market movements. The present coverage of such
indices exceeds 75% of total market capitalization. We transform these variables into
stock market returns through log-diﬀerentiation15.
The question of the currency denomination of the returns remains controversial.
On the one hand, it is usually asserted that foreign investors care about returns
expressed in their own currency. Arbitrage yields a parity condition whereby the
domestic return equals the foreign return plus expected depreciation. In this case,
we would make use of stock market returns in foreign currency. On the other hand,
focusing on returns in local currency allows to eliminate the exchange rate component
of the return. Such a choice is motivated by the fact that exchange rate changes could
oﬀset variations in the stock market return in local currency. We provide a simple
example of this dilemma. Figure 1 represents the evolution of the Thai stock market
return in bahts and in U.S. dollars.
It is well known that the Thai stock market experienced a massive surge following
the announcement of the devaluation of the baht. This is well reﬂected by the index
expressed in bahts. However, the large size of the devaluation leads to a moderate
fall in the index expressed in U.S. dollars. Therefore, looking at indices expressed in
15It can be argued that log-diﬀerentiation is only an approximation to the true percentage change.
We also used stock market returns obtained as true percentage changes. The results remain unaf-
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Figure 1: Thai stock market indices expressed in bahts and U.S. dollars
foreign currency can be misleading whenever the index expressed in local currency
and the exchange rate move in opposite directions. This paper makes use of stock
market returns expressed in local currency.
We also select variables standing for common external shocks. Following the stud-
ies devoted to this issue, we augment the basic speciﬁcation with log-diﬀerentiated
series of the three-month U.S. Treasury bill interest rate, the U.S. stock market and
the yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate. Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) have ar-
gued that ”the sharp appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to the Japanese yen
and the European currencies since the second half of 1995 led to deteriorating cost-
competitiveness in most Asian countries whose currencies were eﬀectively pegged to
the dollar”16.
5 Empirical results on the existence of contagion
This section presents the results obtained from the full-information methodology
proposed by Favero and Giavazzi (2002). Since the approach is articulated around
three steps, we present the outcome of our analysis in three sub-sections.
5.1 The reduced-form model
The ﬁrst step is to estimate the reduced form of the dynamic structural model. Again,
this reduced-form model is simply a vector-autoregressive speciﬁcation. Therefore,
it is necessary to solve the preliminary problem of optimal lag length. We focus
on various selection criteria, namely a sequential modiﬁed likelihood ratio test, the
Akaike information criterion, and the Schwarz criterion17. As is often the case in
16Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), p. 308-309.
17The modiﬁed LR statistic relies on the small sample modiﬁcation proposed by Sims (1980).
16empirical research, these statistics give diﬀerent optimal lag lengths. If we use a
hypothesized maximum lag length of ﬁve, then the likelihood ratio test and the Akaike
criterion select ﬁve lags, whereas the Schwarz criterion selects one lag. If we extend
the hypothesized maximum length to twenty, the likelihood ratio test selects twenty
and the Akaike criterion fourteen, whereas the Schwarz criterion still selects one lag.
In fact, the last two lag selection criteria yield a number representing the trade-oﬀ
between goodness-of-ﬁt and parsimony. The lag length corresponds to the minimum
of these numbers. An increase in the lag order contributes to lowering this number as
it decreases the error sum of squares, but contributes to increasing it as the addition of
lags is penalized because of the desirability of parsimony. Since the Schwarz criterion
penalizes more the addition of lags in a model speciﬁcation, it is not surprising that
it selects a lower number of lags. In the end, since we will estimate a large structural
model and given the sensitivity of both the likelihood ratio test and the Akaike
criterion to the hypothesized maximum lag length, we rely on the Schwarz criterion
and adopt a unit optimal lag length.
To identify country-speciﬁc shocks we examine the residuals of the estimated VAR
model. These are heteroscedastic and as such, they contain episodes of high market
turbulence. We assign dummy variables to residuals which are three times greater
the standard deviation of residuals. Therefore, these dummies will capture extreme
country-speciﬁc events. The choice for the threshold value of 3 is motivated by
parsimony and previous research. Making use of a threshold of 2 yields 190 country-
speciﬁc events and an equivalent number of dummy variables. Moreover, Gindraux
(2002) provides a detailed sensitivity analysis for the threshold values and ﬁnds that
the dummies that are selected by a threshold of 3 are those which typically survive
the testing-down procedure to overidentify the structural system of equations in the
second step of the methodology.
Table 1: Number of shocks
Country Philippines Korea Malaysia Thailand Indonesia
Shocks 10 13 12 11 13
We obtain 59 country-speciﬁc shocks. The appendix provides the dates, coun-
tries, type of shock and the corresponding news retrieved from the online archives
of Bloomberg. These shocks are mostly on the positive side: we identify 36 positive
shocks and 23 negative shocks. Distinguishing between types of shocks is interesting
as the degree and direction of transmission may be asymmetric, an issue to which we
return in the third subsection.
Finally, we note that excluding common external shocks would yield 67 extreme
events. Again, in the context of emerging market economies it is important to account
for common external shocks in order to avoid thinking of an event as being contagious
whereas all countries are in fact aﬀected simultaneously by a common shock.
175.2 The structural model of interdependence
The second step of the methodology is to estimate the dynamic structural model of
simultaneous equations by three-stage least squares. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is fully
identiﬁed by the restriction on the lag structure that only the own lagged variable
enters each equation. Then, in the spirit of the LSE approach, a simpliﬁcation search
is carried out, in which simpler cases are tested against the general model. Since
these special cases are obtained by imposing restrictions on the parameters of the
general models, a simple F test is used to test whether these restrictions are actually
valid. The simpliﬁcation search, also called testing-down procedure, is carried out in
a systematic way and stops whenever the restrictions are rejected by the data.
We start by testing the restriction that the coeﬃcients on all the variables which
are not signiﬁcant in our initial fully identiﬁed speciﬁcation are equal to zero. Since
this restriction is largely rejected by the data, we look for combinations of restrictions
which would not be rejected. Through a systematic analysis we reach a more parsi-
monious speciﬁcation which, however, features a diﬃcult problem. In the equations
corresponding to the Philippines and to Indonesia, we cannot exclude the Malaysian
stock market return as an explanatory endogenous variable. If we do not exclude
this variable, then the coeﬃcients on the diﬀerences of (the log of) the U.S. inter-
est rate, the U.S. stock market index, and the yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, although they are highly signiﬁcant in the other
three equations. However, if we exclude it, then these three common external shocks
become signiﬁcant.
Table 2: Structural system of interdependence
Dependent variable
sPH sKO sMY sTH sIN






Lagged dep. var 0.2293 0.1947 0.1017 0.1100 0.1226
U.S. interest rate 0.2411 0.3079 0.1695 0.2833
U.S. stock market 0.4125 0.3366 0.3451 0.3557 0.5898
JPY/USD rate -0.2253 -0.2232 -0.2113
Observations 671 671 671 671 671
Coeﬃcients in italics are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. All other reported
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Coeﬃcients which are not
reported are not signiﬁcant, either at the 10% or 5% level.
18We conjecture that the common external shocks in these equations are highly
collinear with the Malaysian stock market return. The model captures interdepen-
dence between Malaysia and both the Philippines and Indonesia while these countries
are actually all aﬀected by the external variables. In the end, we choose to drop the
Malaysian stock market return in these two equations to remedy this problem.
The results in table 2 show little evidence of interdependence and a strong inﬂu-
ence of common external shocks. We ﬁnd interdependence from Thailand to Malaysia
and from Korea to Thailand. Therefore, it seems that permanent cross-market link-
ages are very weak in normal tranquil times18. However, the economic situation in
the United States impacts very forcefully on the south-east Asian region19. Most
notably, the behaviour of the U.S. stock market has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect: any
increase in U.S. stock market returns yields an increase in south-east Asian returns.
Moreover, higher interest rates in the United States have a consistently positive eﬀect
on the region, except for Thailand. Although we initially expected a negative sign
consistent with Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993), we would argue that changes
in the level of interest rates in the United States aﬀect expectations to a signiﬁcant
extent. Such changes in expectations are not directly observable and therefore, we
cannot determine unambiguously their impact on emerging stock market returns.
Finally, the yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate is important for Korea, Malaysia and
Indonesia, with a negative sign indicating that a depreciation of the yen relative
to the U.S. dollar represents a loss of competitiveness for these three countries. The
reason why the Philippines and Thailand are not aﬀected may be that their respective
currencies were largely devalued early in the crisis.
5.3 Testing for contagion
We can now focus on the existence of contagion. Again, we interpret as evidence
of nonlinearities the fact that coeﬃcients on country-speciﬁc shocks in four other
countries are signiﬁcant in a given country equation. The null hypothesis of no non-
linearities can be conceptually thought of as a null hypothesis of no bold coeﬃcients
in table 3. It is readily seen that the null hypothesis is rejected20. Most of the
country-speciﬁc events are transmitted across countries in a non-linear way.
18This result contrasts with the ”only interdependence” part of the results obtained by Forbes
and Rigobon (2002).
19Since we use log-diﬀerentiated time series, these coeﬃcients are simply elasticities. A 1% change
in the U.S. stock market return will trigger an x% change in the south-east Asian return, where x
is the reported coeﬃcient.
20This result contrasts with the ”no contagion” part of Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
19Table 3: Existence of contagion
Date Country Type sPH sKO sMY sTH sIN
07/10/96 TH - -0.0657
18/11/96 TH - -0.0630
02/07/97 TH + -0.0235 -0.0225 0.0811
03/07/97 TH + -0.0322 0.0811
11/07/97 PH + 0.0741 0.0245 -0.0412
28/08/97 PH,MY - -0.0813 -0.0781 -0.0438
02/09/97 TH + 0.0659
03/09/97 MY, IN -, + -0.0579 0.0742
05/09/97 MY, IN + 0.1154 0.0407 0.1204
23/10/97 PH - -0.0446 -0.0211
29/10/97 IN + 0.0304 0.0485
03/11/97 KO, MY + 0.0782 0.0615
18/11/97 MY - -0.0187 -0.0661
20/11/97 MY - -0.0971 -0.0427
24/11/97 KO - -0.1137 0.0231 0.0628
04/12/97 KO + 0.0754 0.0335 0.0378
08/12/97 MY + -0.0505 0.0815 0.0358
09/12/97 MY - -0.0604 -0.0610
15/12/97 KO + 0.1205 -0.0660
23/12/97 KO - -0.0191 -0.0857
26/12/97 KO + 0.0703 -0.0400
08/01/98 IN - -0.0328 0.0397 -0.0533 -0.1608
09/01/98 PH - -0.0671
12/01/98 KO + 0.0384 0.1209 -0.0599 0.0412
13/01/98 IN + 0.0361 0.0376 0.0479 0.0943
15/01/98 IN - 0.0617 -0.0420 -0.0583
16/01/98 TH + -0.0385 0.1057 0.0894
19/01/98 PH, KO, MY, TH + 0.0607 0.0953 0.0588 0.0796 0.0629
30/01/98 PH, KO, TH + 0.0776 0.0788 -0.0322 0.0981
02/02/98 PH, TH, IN + 0.0755 -0.0354 -0.0320 0.1238
03/02/98 PH, MY, IN -, +, - -0.0605 0.1904 -0.1024
04/02/98 TH - -0.1038
05/02/98 MY, TH + 0.0384 0.0746
11/02/98 PH, IN +, - 0.0538 -0.0350 -0.0928
12/02/98 IN - -0.0316 -0.0614 -0.1112
10/03/98 MY + 0.0494 0.0507
26/03/98 IN + 0.0769
04/05/98 KO - -0.0760
13/05/98 IN - -0.0220 -0.0373 -0.0955
19/05/98 IN + -0.0231 0.0931
12/06/98 KO - 0.0206 -0.0747
17/06/98 KO + 0.0802 0.0527 0.0443
19/06/98 PH - -0.0457 -0.0580
20/07/98 KO + -0.0274 0.1006
Coeﬃcients in italics are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. All other reported
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Coeﬃcients which are not reported
are not signiﬁcant, either at the 10% or 5% level. Bold coeﬃcients correspond
to dummies for some country which are also signiﬁcant in other countries.
In other words, the propagation mechanism is not stable over time. Moreover,
positive or negative shocks do not necessarily imply positive or negative reactions,
respectively, of other stock markets21. For example, although the devaluation of the
21Since the reported coeﬃcients are those of dummy variables, and since the dependent variable
is a percentage change, we can interpret the values of the coeﬃcients as percentage changes in other
markets following an event in some given country. For example, the devaluation of the Thai baht
on 2nd July 1997 contributes to a reduction of 2.35% in the Philippine stock market.
20Thai baht on 2nd July 1997 leads to a surge in Thailand’s stock market, it triggers
a fall in the Philippine and Malaysian stock markets. Otherwise, stock markets may
collapse together. For example, on 12th February 1998 Stanley Fischer, at the time
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, says that Indonesia is not ready to peg its
currency to a reserve currency. This announcement leads not only to a crash in the
Indonesian stock market, but also to a signiﬁcant decline in the Philippines and in
Malaysia. The evidence points out that we should not specify the null hypothesis as
no signiﬁcant increase in cross-market linkages, but rather as no signiﬁcant change in
these linkages, a point already noted in section 3 when we discuss the methodology.
Therefore, even if it is true that at times of crises capital ﬂows out of the region, it
seems that investors reallocate funds within the south-east Asian region according to
country-speciﬁc news.
Table 4: Transmission of shocks
Type of shock
Positive Negative
Eﬀect on other Positive 0.52 0.25
markets Negative 0.48 0.75
It is interesting to examine the direction of the transmission in more details. We
ﬁnd that about half of the positive shocks are transmitted positively (0.52), in the
sense that a soaring stock market in one country leads another market to surge as well.
By deﬁnition, half of the positive shocks are transmitted negatively (0.48), which
points out to the fact that investors sell in one market and reinvest into another
market, reinforcing the conclusion developed in the previous paragraph. However,
three quarters of the negative shocks have negative eﬀects, in the sense that a crash
in one market leads to a crash in another market. By deﬁnition, again, one quarter
of country-speciﬁc crashes leads to rising stock market in other countries. Thus, we
obtain prima facie evidence of an asymmetric international transmission of country-
speciﬁc shocks. Whereas positive shocks can lead to increases or decreases in other
markets with a nearly equal probability, negative shocks are more likely to lead to
adverse eﬀects on neighbouring stock markets.
Such empirical evidence could not be obtained with alternative methodologies
to test for the existence of contagion. Correlation analysis relies on a comparison
of correlation coeﬃcients across periods of low and high turbulence. The limited-
information approach of Rigobon (2000) does not require the estimation of a struc-
tural model and only computes a test statistic. Both these approaches do not identify
idiosyncratic shocks explicitly and therefore, we cannot examine the direction of the
impact of such shocks on other stock markets.
One ﬁnal remark is noteworthy. Country-speciﬁc shocks tend to occur in clus-
ters over time. In other words, we observe clusters of very high ﬁnancial market
turbulence with more tranquil periods otherwise. The ﬁnancial data show clusters
21such as early July 1997, early September 1997, then a long sequence of shocks from
early November to early February 1998, with more dispersed shocks for the end of
the sample. Nowadays, the empirical literature on contagion focuses on the so-called
1997/98 Asian crisis. However, we should remember that this crisis was initially seen
as a Thai crisis. It is only after a few months that it was clearly understood that
speculative attacks and ﬁnancial crises would aﬀect the whole region, including Korea
which had been recently admitted as a member of the OECD. In fact, it is interesting
to see that Korea was not aﬀected by contagious eﬀects until early December 1997.
The ﬁrst bold coeﬃcient for Korea corresponds to 8th December 1997. Once that this
country was undergoing severe diﬃculties, however, it has suﬀered from contagious
eﬀects from neighbouring countries.
5.4 Implications for international portfolio diversiﬁcation
The fundamental reason behind international portfolio diversiﬁcation remains that it
allows to expand the investment opportunity set. Investors are able to allocate wealth
between a higher number of securities, thereby reducing the eﬀect of idiosyncratic risk.
There is empirical evidence showing that indeed, diversifying internationally brings
about an economically signiﬁcant gain (Solnik [1997], Griﬃn and Karolyi [1998] and
Nilsson [2002]).
However, to the extent that stock market comovements increase at times of market
distress, the gains from international portfolio diversiﬁcation should be reduced just
when they are most needed. Butler and Joaquin (2002) ﬁnd that these gains decrease
in bear markets. The strategy is to divide the sample of stock market returns into
three categories, namely bear, normal and bull markets. Correlations are higher in
bear markets than in normal or bull markets. Then, they build an equally weighted
portfolio of the domestic market and the international market and ﬁnd that its return
is reduced by about 2% in bear markets compared to what it would have been if cross-
market linkages would not change. Das and Uppal (2002) study simultaneous jumps
in stock market returns and interpret such jumps as contagious events leading to
systemic risk. They ﬁnd evidence that such systemic risk decreases the gains from
international diversiﬁcation only marginally.
The common feature of the studies which quantify the reduction in gains from
diversiﬁcation is the assumption that cross-market linkages increase during periods of
high turbulence. However, as our results show, we should really focus on changes in
cross-market linkages and not exclusively on increases. Positive and negative shocks
aﬀect other stock markets with diﬀerent probabilities. These features of contagion
should be taken into account. We have found cases where cross-market relationships
actually decrease, thereby potentially increasing the gains from diversifying across
markets. Assuming that markets exhibit greater comovements at times of distress is
a limiting assumption.
226 The limits of the limited-information approach
This section examines the reasons behind the divergence of our results relative to those
obtained by Rigobon (2001, 2002) obtained with the limited-information approach.
We make use of Monte Carlo simulations and show that this approach features some
limitations which may lead to not rejecting the null hypothesis of no contagion when
it should in fact be rejected. We proceed as follows. Firstly, we follow closely Favero
and Giavazzi (2002) to show that in the context of the limited-information method
a test for contagion is a Hausman test for the validity of the constructed instru-
ment. Secondly, we lay out the setup of our Monte Carlo experiments with particular
emphasis on the various assumptions that characterize the procedure. Thirdly, we
present the results of some simulation experiments.
6.1 A test for contagion as a Hausman test
Monte Carlo simulations assume that the true data generating process is known to
the researcher. This process should be speciﬁed either under some null hypothesis or
some alternative hypothesis. Once that the data have been generated, we can apply
estimation methods and/or statistical tests to examine the problem under investiga-
tion.




























where zt is a common unobservable shock and ε1,t and ε2,t are idiosyncratic shocks.
For the sake of the exposition, and without loss of generality, we will assume that














The sample will include abnormal high-volatility events. The limited-information
approach relies on splitting the whole sample conditional on the volatility regime. In
other words, we will identify two diﬀerent regimes according to whether volatility is
high or low. In terms of the full-information approach of Favero and Giavazzi (2002),


























22For the construction of these equations, we refer the reader to section 3 of this paper.


















Suppose that we are interested in estimating the coeﬃcient β21. Rigobon (2000)



















We now demonstrate that this instrument is valid only under the null hypothesis of
no contagion, so that a test for the stability of parameters can be simply implemented
as a Hausman test for the validity of instruments. The usual conditions for validity
and consistency are
plim(wts1,t) 6= 0 (36)
plim(wtε2,t) = 0 (37)
In words, the instrument should be correlated with the original endogenous ex-
planatory variables, whereas it should be uncorrelated with the error term. In the
context of the limited-information approach, the null hypothesis is deﬁned as pa-
rameter stability. However, the alternative hypothesis can be interpreted either as
parameter instability or as a violation of the assumption that only the variance of
one of the idiosyncratic shocks increases. Therefore, in what follows we assume that
only σ2
ε1 increases in the sub-sample of high volatility. So,
V ar(ε1 | C) > V ar(ε1) (38)
V ar(ε2 | C) = V ar(ε2) (39)
V ar(z | C) = V ar(z) (40)
Looking at equation (32) our speciﬁc assumption on the variances implies that
a12 = a22 = 0. The model simpliﬁes to23










































































ε1 > 0 (45)
provided that β12β21 6= 1. Therefore, the instrument is correlated with the original
endogenous variable as long as the heteroscedasticity in country 1 increases in the
high-volatility sub-sample, that is, as long as d1 6= 0. In particular, the eﬃciency of
the instrument will depend on the relative heteroscedasticity across sub-samples of
low and high volatility. Secondly, denoting ε∗










































which is equal to zero only under the null hypothesis of no contagion, that is,
when a21 = 0. Therefore, again, a test for contagion can be simply implemented as a
Hausman test for the validity of the instrument.
Clearly, these results illustrate the large-sample, or asymptotic, properties of the
constructed instrument. In practice, however, only ﬁnite samples of data are available.
Therefore, it remains important to study the ﬁnite-sample properties of the methodol-
ogy. Such an investigation being very cumbersome analytically in the present context,
we make use of Monte Carlo simulations to study the power of the limited-information
technique.
6.2 Setup of the Monte Carlo simulation
We turn to a complete description of the setup of our simulations. We start by
describing the data generating process with a detailed discussion on the way idiosyn-




























This is a structural system of simultaneous equations which is exactly identiﬁed
by restricting the lag structure. When each equation is identiﬁed it is possible to
associate unique structural parameter values with the reduced-form system.
Since we are interested in studying the power of the test proposed by Rigobon
(2000) we will generate the values for the endogenous variables under the alternative
hypothesis. In that context a rejection of the null hypothesis implies either that the
parameters are not stable or that the necessary assumption that the variance of only
one of the idiosyncratic shocks increases in a sub-sample of the data is not satisﬁed.
Therefore, we will assume that only the variance of ε1 changes in a sub-sample of
the data, whereas the variances of ε2 and z are constant over the entire sample. In
this way we guarantee that a rejection of the null hypothesis is really a rejection of
parameter stability.
The stock market in country 1 is aﬀected by occasional abnormal high-volatility
events. Such events are drawn from a binomial distribution in which the probability
of an event is varied across successive experiments. Then, we can construct two sub-
samples according to whether an event has taken place or not. In the low-volatility
regime, where no event occurs, the standard deviation of all the shocks is identi-
cal and normalized to 0.02. In the high-volatility regime, we increase the standard
deviation of ε1 by a factor λ > 1 in successive experiments, whereas the standard
deviations of the other shocks remain constant. In all experiments, idiosyncratic and
common unobservable shocks are drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero
and variance deﬁned as explained.
We also assign some parameter values to the structural parameters. Since we
generate the observations under the alternative hypothesis of parameter instability, we
select diﬀerent values for the interdependence coeﬃcients conditional on the volatility
regime, either low (L) or high (H).

















Since we are dealing with a dynamic model we must also specify starting values.
The focus of our analysis being stock market returns, we choose s1,0 = s2,0 = 0. We
26use the reduced-form model to generate observations for both endogenous variables.
We then construct the instruments as proposed by Rigobon (2000) and explained
in the previous sub-section. Finally, we compute the test and check whether the
instrument is valid or not24.
This whole analysis is replicated 100 times for each value of the probability of an
event and for each value of the increase in the variance of the idiosyncratic shock in
country 1. These two values are varied across successive experiments. We conjecture
that the smaller the size of the sub-sample of events, and the smaller the relative
increase in σ2
ε1, the smaller the power of the test. Intuitively, asymptotic results
will not apply if the size of the high-volatility sub-sample is very small. Moreover,
the eﬃciency of the instrumental-variable estimator will increase with the relative
heteroscedasticity across sub-samples of high and low volatility.
6.3 Simulation results
We start by studying a baseline model. Its parameters are chosen in line with the
empirical evidence obtained from our estimation of the structural model of inter-
dependence which results are given in section 5. The sample contains N = 500
observations. Typically, the standard deviation of shocks in normal times is about
0.02 whereas it doubles in periods of high turbulence. Moreover, across the whole
sample between two and three percent of the observations for each country represent
abnormal high-volatility events.
Table 6 presents our simulation results for the baseline model. The numbers
inside the table are probabilities (multiplied by 100) that the estimator rejects the
null hypothesis, as it should. To interpret the results, the ﬁrst row of numbers in
italics of the table contains values ranging from 0.02 to 0.20. These correspond to
the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock in country 1. As expected, as
this standard deviation increases, the instrumental-variable estimator gains power
in rejecting the null hypothesis. Clearly, if there is no increase in the variance of
any idiosyncratic shock the test has no power. This is illustrated by the fact that
probabilities in the second column of table 6 are close to zero. The ﬁrst column of
numbers in italics contains values ranging from 0.01 to 0.10. These correspond to the
percentage of observations which are abnormal. In other words, it is the relative size
of the high-volatility sub-sample. As expected, the instrumental-variable estimator
gains power as this relative size increases.
24We implement the Hausman test making use of artiﬁcial regressions. For more details, see
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), chp. 7. For an application to the nonlinear transmission of
country-speciﬁc shocks between the United States and Germany, see Bonﬁglioli and Favero (2002).
Firstly, we regress the endogenous variable in the second equation of the system on a constant and
the constructed instrument. We retrieve the estimated residuals and reestimate the second equation
of the structural model, augmented with these residuals. Whenever these do not enter signiﬁcantly,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of parameter stability.










0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.01 5 32 64 84 88 92 96 93 98 98
0.02 4 54 79 95 98 100 100 100 100 100
0.03 3 55 92 98 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.04 5 79 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.05 6 77 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.06 4 89 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.07 7 88 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.08 8 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.09 4 91 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.10 11 92 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
It is interesting to select the value in the table which corresponds to the parameters
given by our sample of data on the Asian crisis. We found that the standard deviation
of the idiosyncratic shock in a country roughly doubles in periods of high turbulence,
from 0.02 to 0.04. Moreover, we also determined that between two and three percent
of all observations for each country correspond to abnormal events. This precise
combination of parameters yields a value in table 6 equal to 0.55. In words, although
the model features a structural break in both equations of the dynamic system the
probability that the test proposed by Rigobon (2000) rejects the null hypothesis is
only about half. This value is far from the expected value of 0.95.
On the basis of our results we conclude that the instrumental-variable estimator
should be used with caution. Its power depends both on the relative size of the
sub-sample of abnormal events and on the relative degree of heteroscedasticity across
the two sub-samples. The evidence provided by Rigobon (2001, 2002) that the null
hypothesis of no contagion in stock markets cannot be rejected for the 1997/98 Asian
crisis could stem from the lack of power of the limited-information methodology. This
evidence is a ﬁrst step towards a better understanding of the divergence in the results
on the existence of contagion.
We now turn to an examination of the sensitivity of the results from the base-
line model to changes in key parameters. Firstly, we restrict the total number of
observations to 100, while keeping other parameters constant. Table 7 presents the
results.










0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.01 7 16 18 35 28 53 48 54 58 54
0.02 6 16 40 51 56 66 65 74 76 76
0.03 4 27 49 57 67 81 74 86 86 86
0.04 5 25 59 74 76 84 90 91 94 96
0.05 8 21 57 78 90 90 90 94 98 99
0.06 2 24 63 80 95 98 96 97 96 97
0.07 3 33 73 91 95 94 98 97 98 99
0.08 5 32 76 89 91 97 99 99 100 100
0.09 5 46 78 93 93 96 100 99 99 98
0.10 7 38 80 92 94 98 100 100 100 100
Clearly, the power deteriorates when the total sample size decreases. Relative
to the baseline model there are less observations and asymptotic results should hold
even less than under a total sample size equal to 500. In general, the larger the overall
sample size, the larger the power of the test.
We also test the power of the method when the structural interdependence co-
eﬃcients break in one country only. Table 8 presents the results when the baseline















0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.01 5 30 64 81 93 98 94 95 96 100
0.02 3 53 89 98 99 99 99 100 99 100
0.03 6 71 97 98 100 98 100 100 100 100
0.04 4 74 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.05 7 80 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.06 3 82 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.07 4 92 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.08 4 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.09 8 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.10 8 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
















0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.01 5 27 58 80 83 94 94 95 94 96
0.02 6 48 77 95 99 100 98 100 100 100
0.03 6 54 91 98 99 100 100 100 100 100
0.04 6 73 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.05 6 72 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.06 4 82 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.07 8 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.08 4 96 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.09 2 91 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.10 6 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Finally, we assume larger structural breaks in both equations. In particular,
relative to the baseline model, we assume that β
H
12 = 0.6 and β
H
21 = 0.6. Table 10
summarizes the results.










0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.01 1 36 71 83 88 91 96 97 97 95
0.02 3 51 82 97 100 99 100 99 100 100
0.03 5 63 93 99 99 100 100 100 100 100
0.04 4 68 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.05 3 80 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.06 5 85 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.07 6 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.08 1 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.09 2 95 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.10 3 89 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Overall the power of the limited-information methodology does not seem to de-
pend largely on the number of structural breaks or on the magnitude of these breaks.
However, our sensitivity analysis shows that not only the relative size of the high-
volatility matters, but also the total size of the sample of data. This approach is very
convenient since it does not require to impose arbitrary restrictions to obtain iden-
tiﬁcation and to estimate structural models. However, it is only appropriate under
certain conditions. Our Monte Carlo simulation emphasize some key parameters.
307 Concluding remarks
The objective of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, we have applied the full-information
methodology proposed by Favero and Giavazzi (2002) to testing for contagion during
the 1997/98 Asian crisis. Our results reject the null hypothesis of no contagion, so
that the transmission mechanism of country-speciﬁc shocks changes in the face of
high-volatility abnormal events. In contrast with the earlier correlation approach we
ﬁnd that stock market comovements are either reinforced or weakened in periods of
high turbulence. However, this eﬀect features an asymmetry. While negative shocks
mostly have a negative impact on other markets, positive shocks can lead to either a
positive or a negative eﬀect on these other markets, with a probability of about half.
We interpret this as prima facie evidence that investors discriminate among stock
markets in good times, but tend to exit all markets in bad times.
Secondly, since our results on the existence of contagion diverge with those ob-
tained by Rigobon (2001, 2002) using a limited-information approach, we have pre-
sented some Monte Carlo simulations to examine the necessary conditions for the
power of the latter methodology. This is especially important since this method is
used in an increasing number of economic ﬁelds, e.g. monetary policy and asset
prices. We ﬁnd that the total size of the sample of data, the relative size of the
sub-sample of abnormal events, as well as the relative degree of heteroscedasticity
between sub-samples of low and high volatility, are important determinants of the
power of the methodology.
Interestingly, selecting parameters on the basis of our empirical estimations leads
the limited-information technology to reject the null hypothesis only with a proba-
bility of half when it should in fact be rejected with a probability of 0.95. This result
can be a ﬁrst step in explaining the divergence of our results with those obtained by
Rigobon (2001, 2002).
The existence of nonlinearities in the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks has im-
portant implications for portfolio management and the measurement of the potential
beneﬁts from international portfolio diversiﬁcation. Firstly, changes in the trans-
mission mechanism make it more diﬃcult for portfolio managers to rebalance their
portfolios optimally. Secondly, a usual approach to discuss the beneﬁts of diversi-
ﬁcation relies on a consideration of cross-market correlations. It has been argued
that since correlations increase during periods of crises, these beneﬁts become re-
duced just when they are most needed. Our results show that such statements are
incomplete since changes in market comovements in times of high turbulence are not
uni-directional. Further research should assess the implications of our results for the
empirical measurement of the beneﬁts of international portfolio diversiﬁcation.
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33Date  Country  Type  News in Bloomberg 
07/10/96  Thailand  -  Bank of Thailand imposes new measures on offshore lending by foreign-
owned banks in an effort to better control the flow of foreign funds. Stock 
market index plunges amid concern that high annual economic growth is a 
thing of the past. Investors sell bahts and switch to a rising yen. 
18/11/96  Thailand  -  Phone issues fall on expectations that new projects and revised contracts will 
not materialize soon. 
02/07/97  Thailand  +  Devaluation of the baht, in order to boost exports, scrapping a formula used 
since 1984 that pegged the baht to a basket of foreign currencies but 
dominated by the U.S. dollar. 
03/07/97  Thailand  +  Thai stocks extend their biggest rally since 1992 on optimism a devaluation 
will help revive its flagging economy. 
11/07/97  Philippines  +  Devaluation of the currency. Stocks soar after the central bank allows the peso 
to weaken, giving up a costly defense strategy that drove interest rates up and 
threatened to slow down growth significantly. 
28/08/97 Philippines, 
Malaysia 
-  Philippine stock market crashes in the midst of panic. 
Malaysian stocks tumble to four-year low after the stock exchange curbs 
trading in the 100 stocks of the benchmark index. Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad asks local state-run pension funds to buy stocks the next day, and 
blames George Soros. 
02/09/97  Thailand  +  Stocks rally, reversing a rout that slashed more than 20 percent off the 
benchmark index in 13 days after banks reveal that bad debts are no worse 
than investors expected. 
03/09/97 Malaysia, 
Indonesia 
-, +  Malaysian stock index plunges led by an electric utility, a weakening of the 
currency, and the failure of the government's efforts to prop up the market for 
a third day. 
Indonesia announces "credible proactive measures" to restore stability to its 
currency and economy. 
05/09/97 Malaysia, 
Indonesia 
+  Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad says the government will raise 
30 billion ringgit through a bond sale and use the money to buy Malaysian 
stocks in a bid to prop up the declining stock market. 
Indonesian stock index surges – its biggest one-day gain in almost four years 
– after the government announces plans to boost exports and says that it will 
abolish the 49-percent limit on foreign ownership of shares in initial public 
offerings. 
23/10/97  Philippines  -  Bankers and brokers say that a bill pending in Congress would set back the 
development of the Philippine capital markets by taxing stocks and bonds 
more heavily than in other countries. 
29/10/97  Indonesia  +  Stocks jump led by domestic phone monopoly PT Telkom and tobacco 
company Gudang Garam. 
03/11/97 Korea, 
Malaysia 
+  Korean stocks rise, recovering from early declines, as the raised ceiling on 
foreign ownership of shares takes effect. 
Malaysian stock index increases, its largest one-day percentage gain in two 
months, as investors buy stocks they see as attractive relative to potential 
earnings. 
18/11/97  Malaysia  -  Stock index plunges after the speedy approval of United Engineers' purchase 
of share in its parent company raises concern about a lax regulatory 
environment. 
20/11/97  Malaysia  -  Stock index plunges as investors flee some of the country's largest stocks after 
Renong's bailout by a cash-rich unit raises concern about corporate 
transparency. 
24/11/97  Korea  -  Stock index suffers its worst plunge in history as the country prepares to 
forfeit years of economic growth for a bailout from the IMF, imposing tax 
raises and spending cuts. 
04/12/97  Korea  +  Stocks surge for the biggest rally ever after the country's agreement to accept 
a $55 billion international bailout. The government promises to increase 
access to financial markets in return for the IMF bailout. 
08/12/97  Malaysia  +  Stock index posts record  gains after the government takes action to avoid 
asking the IMF for help. 
09/12/97  Malaysia  -  Stock index sinks amid concern that the government's measures to slow 
Appendixeconomic growth will hurt corporate profits. 
15/12/97  Korea  +  The country steps back from the financial brink as the prospect of billions of 
dollars in emergency credit from the IMF restores confidence. The Finance 
Ministry announces that it will remove its 10-percent daily fluctuation limit on 
trading of the won from the next day onwards. 
23/12/97  Korea  -  International credit rating agencies downgrade Korea's foreign-currency 
denominated debt. 
26/12/97  Korea  +  Financial markets rally after the IMF and G-7 nations pledge $10 billion in 
accelerated aid to the country. The Bank of England asks British banks to 
extend the length of their loans to Korean banks to ease Korea's financial 
crisis. Korea says that it will let its banks dismiss a large number of 
employees, removing a key obstacle to acquisitions by foreign rivals. 
08/01/98  Indonesia  -  Financial crisis deepens as concerns that the IMF will suspend its $23 billion 
bailout package sends the stock market to a four-year low. 
09/01/98 Philippines  -  Stocks  plunge on fears that the economy is headed for a recession brought on 
by rising interest rates and a plummeting currency. 
12/01/98  Korea  +  Stocks rise on optimism that the country is emerging from its financial crisis. 
An official tells the Japanese Finance Minister Mitsuzuka that Korea's 
economic situation is improving because of the smooth rollover of its foreign 
debt. 
13/01/98  Indonesia  +  The government announces that it will reduce the cost of foreign investment 
to boost confidence. The currency strengthens after the IMF says it would 
drop a demand that Indonesia run a budget surplus in the next fiscal year. 
Stocks rally as investors bet talks among President Suharto, the United States, 
and the IMF will yield new reforms to put the derailed economy back on 
track. The government announces that it will postpone 15 power and highway 
projects to demonstrate commitment to reforms. 
15/01/98  Indonesia  -  Promises of economic reforms are met with increasing scepticism. The latest 
package of reforms arrives with a thud as the stock market falls. 
16/01/98  Thailand  +  Stocks rally, posting their second-biggest gain in two months, after the IMF 





+  Philippine stocks rally as the peso rises to a two-week high, prompting 
optimism that the country would be the first to emerge from the Asian crisis. 
Seven UK banks decide to roll over loans to Korean banks until March 31
st in 
a bid to ease Korea's economic crisis. 
Malaysian stock index soars as investors cheer remarks by the IMF on the 
previous Friday that the country does not need a bailout. 
Thai stock surge amid confidence that the country will be able to loosen the 




+  Philippine stocks soar as the trade gap narrows by 36%, the second smallest 
deficit in the past three years. 
Korean stocks rally after international lenders agree to extend $24 billion of 
commercial bank debt for as long as three years. The new Korean government 
will support shareholder rights and force companies to provide more 
information to investors. 
Thai stocks surge as foreign exchange controls are lifted in a sign of 




+  Philippine stocks surge on hopes of economic recovery. 
Thai stocks rally for a fourth day amid optimism that the country has begun to 
turn around, helped by a lower than expected inflation in January. 
Indonesian stock index surges, its biggest one-day rise in more than eight 
years, on hopes that banking reforms unveiled by the government will help 
put the economy back on track. Indonesia will end monopolies and price 
controls for a host of basic food commodities in the next two years to meet its 




-, +, -  President Ramos accepts the resignation of Commissioner Kintanar of the 
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), who is running for 
Congress in elections in May 1998. 
Malaysian stock index in its biggest one-day percentage gain ever, amid 
optimism that Asia's currency and stock market turmoil may be near an end. Indonesian stocks fall as optimism fuelled by previous week's banking 
reforms is deflated by a weakening rupiah. 
04/02/98  Thailand  -  Stock index posts its biggest one-day loss in more than seven years as 




+  Malaysia's Commerce Asset says it is in talks to merge its bank unit with 
RHB. 
Thai stocks rebound after their biggest tumble since 1990 after investors bet 
the worst of the crisis is over and the baht may strengthen. 
11/02/98 Philippines, 
Indonesia 
+, -  Philippine stocks surge as a strengthening peso bolsters investors' confidence 
that the crisis is over. 
Indonesian stock index posts its biggest one-day decline in five weeks on 
investor concern that capital controls will accompany plans to peg the rupiah 
to another currency. 
12/02/98  Indonesia  -  Stanley Fischer, deputy managing director of the IMF, says that Indonesia is 
not ready to peg its currency to a reserve currency. A former IMF economist 
who briefed Indonesian officials on ways to peg the rupiah to the U.S. dollar 
says he is afraid President Suharto is now rushing headlong into a bad 
decision to adopt the plan. 
10/03/98  Malaysia  +  Stocks rise after the government says that it is prepared to let troubled banks 
fail, thereby easing investor concerns that cash-rich companies will be coerced 
into buying cash-strapped companies. 
26/03/98  Indonesia  +  Stocks surge as the more stable rupiah and optimism about solutions to the 
country's foreign debt attracts investors. 
04/05/98  Korea  -  Stocks take their biggest tumble in three weeks as violent confrontations 
between organised labour and riot police shake the government's efforts to 
stabilize the recession-torn economy. 
13/05/98 Indonesia  -  Student  protests calling for Suharto's ouster escalate in Jakarta. 
19/05/98  Indonesia  +  President Suharto promises to quickly move the country toward new elections 
in which he will not run. 
12/06/98  Korea  -  Stock index plunges to its lowest level in more than eleven years as the 
weakening yen challenges Korean exports. 
17/06/98  Korea  +  Banks will recommend the immediate liquidation of about 50 companies – 
more than twice what they first proposed – in a key test of the country's 
resolve to reshape its sprawling conglomerates. 
19/06/98  Philippines  -  Stock index takes its biggest plunge in more than five months. 
20/07/98  Korea  +  Shares take their biggest rally in a month amid optimism that the combination 
of a strong won and falling interest rates will bolster corporate profits. 
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International Center FAME - Partner Institutions 
 
 
The University of Geneva 
The University of Geneva, originally known as the Academy of Geneva, was founded in 1559 by Jean 
Calvin and Theodore de Beze.  In 1873, The Academy of Geneva became the University of Geneva with the 
creation of a medical school.  The Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences was created in 1915.  The 
university is now composed of seven faculties of science; medicine; arts; law; economic and social sciences; 
psychology; education, and theology.  It also includes a school of translation and interpretation; an institute 
of architecture; seven interdisciplinary centers and six associated institutes. 
 
More than 13’000 students, the majority being foreigners, are enrolled in the various programs from the 
licence to high-level doctorates. A staff of more than 2’500 persons (professors, lecturers and assistants) is 
dedicated to the transmission and advancement of scientific knowledge through teaching as well as 
fundamental and applied research. The University of Geneva has been able to preserve the ancient European 
tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic 
and cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, 
and international spheres. 
 
Lausanne is a comprehensive university composed of seven Schools and Faculties: religious studies; law; 
arts; social and political sciences; business; science and medicine. With its 9’000 students, it is a medium-
sized institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage 
interdisciplinary work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of 
Lake Leman in the Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the 
landscape depicted in Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of 
the School of Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of 
Biochemistry is located in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of 
the League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation 
closely connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its 
international character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the 
approximately 650 students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further 
emphasized by the use of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which 
draws upon the methods of  economics, history, law, and political science - reflects its aim to provide a 
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